In an Uncertain World: Tough Choices from Wall Street to Washington
第70代米財務長官の回顧録。リーマンショックから景気が回復し、次の時代に移ろうとしている昨今、アジア危機の前後の動きを新めて読むことは有益と思いました。
冒頭は、確率論的な思考（蓋然性思考）の話。
People who have worked with me know that I don’t believe in certainty.
ディーリング・ルームで様々な危機を見てきた著者の哲学が、本書を貫いています。メキシコ危機等の経済危機への対応を読み進めると、当時のことを思い出しました。綱渡りながらも最後には、
Mexico paid us $1.4 billion dollars in interest and left the ESF with a profit of $580 million — the excess over what our money would have earned in U.S. Treasury notes.
Thomas Friedman のコメント(p.34)
“the leaset popular, least understoo, but most important foreign policy decision of the Clinton presidency.”
アジア危機時の日本政府の動きについては、厳しいコメントがありました。
Our focus on Japan’s economic weakness had begun long before the Asian crisis erupted. But as we became increasingly worried about the risk of contagion in the region during the fall of 1997, we became more troubled by the adverse impact Japan’s failure to deal with its own economic problem
was having on the region. p.223
たしかに、ボロボロでしたね。
経済危機の教訓が、The Rubin Doctrine of International Finance としてまとめられています。p.251
1. The only certainty in life is that nothing is ever certain.
2. Markets are good, but they are not the solution to all problems.
3. The credibility and the quality of a nation’s policies matter more for its prospects than anything the United States, the G-7, or the international financial institutions can do.
4. Money is no substitute for strong policy, but there are times when it is more costly to provide too little money than to provide too much.
5. Borrwers must bear the consequences of the debts they incure — and creditors of the lending they provide
6. The United States must be willing to be the defined by what i is against, as well as what it is for.
7. The dollar is too important to be used as an instrument of trade policy.
8. Optionality is good in itself
9. Never let your rhetoric commit you to something you cannot deliver.
10. Gimmicks are no substitute for serious analysis and care in decision making.
日本こそ、先行して経済危機にあったのですから、こうした教訓をもって、次の危機に当たるべきでした。
アジア経済危機時の著者の日本に対する不満は、p.225
The attitude of much of Japan’s political establishment seemed to be that of a trader praying over his weakning positions, when what he needed to do was to reevaluate them unsentimentally and make whatever changes made sense.
これを受けた、1997年4月の橋下首相とのやりとりは、p.225。
When the President brought up the economy, the Prime Minister took out charts he had brought with him that purportedly showed that Japan was on the verge of turning itself around. He said that it was going to start growing again. Hashimoto complained that “Rubin and Summers” — both of whom were sitting there in the meeting — were saying all these things publicly, but they were entirely wrong.
すごい自信ですが、翌年、長銀が破綻するんですね。当時は、ジャパン・パッシングが失礼とか言っておりましたが、自ら力をつけなければならないと思うのでした。
